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Low Frequency of Fires From Alcohol-
Based Hand Rub Dispensers in
Healthcare Facilities
John M. Boyce, MD; Michele L. Pearson, MD
ABSTRACT
We administered a web-based questionnaire to SHEA,
APIC, and EIN members to assess the frequency of fires associ-
ated with alcohol-based hand rub (ABHR) dispensers in health-
care settings. None of the 798 responding facilities using ABHRs
reported a dispenser-related fire; 766 facilities had accrued an
estimated 1,430 hospital-years of ABHR use (Infect Control Hosp
Epidemiol 2003;24:618-619).
Alcohol-based hand rubs have been used routinely
by healthcare workers (HCWs) in some parts of Europe
for decades.1-3 Compared with soap and water hand wash-
ing, these products require less time to use, can be more
accessible than sinks, cause less skin irritation and dry-
ness, are more effective in reducing the bacterial count
on hands, and when made widely available within an insti-
tution, have been shown to improve hand hygiene prac-
tices among HCWs.4 In view of these advantages, the
Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory
Committee of the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention recently recommended the routine use of
alcohol-based hand rubs by HCWs, as long as their hands
are not visibly soiled with blood or other proteinaceous
material.5 To make these products readily accessible to
HCWs, the new Guideline for Hand Hygiene in Health-
care Settings5 recommends that alcohol-based hand rub
dispensers be placed adjacent to patient beds, in hallways
immediately outside patient rooms, and in other conve-
nient locations. However, the implementation of alcohol-
based hand rubs, particularly the placement of the dis-
pensers in hallways, has been impeded in healthcare
facilities in several states because of the concerns of local
fire marshals that they may pose a fire hazard. 
METHODS
To obtain data on the frequency of fires related to
alcohol-based hand rub dispensers, we administered a
web-based questionnaire to members of the Society for
Healthcare Epidemiology of America (SHEA), the
Association of Professionals in Infection Control and
Epidemiology (APIC), and the Emerging Infections
Network (EIN) of the Infectious Diseases Society of
America in March 2003. We obtained information regard-
ing the routine use of alcohol-based hand rubs in facili-
ties, the date (month and year) that the use began, the
location of the dispensers within the facilities, and
whether any fires had been attributed to the dispensers.
We also asked whether they had been instructed by local
fire marshals to remove or relocate the dispensers from
hallways, change the size of the dispensers, or change
the storage conditions of large stocks of alcohol-based
hand rubs. Finally, we calculated the months of use of
alcohol-based hand rubs for each facility and the cumula-
tive months of use for all respondents. For the 122 (16%)
facilities that reported only the year that alcohol-based
hand rubs were implemented, we arbitrarily assumed
that use began in July of the respective year.
RESULTS
A total of 840 nonduplicate responses representing
50 states and the District of Columbia were returned with-
in 7 days of posting the questionnaire; 798 respondents
(95%) reported that alcohol-based hand rubs were being
used in their facilities. Although a few facilities had been
using alcohol-based hand rubs since the 1980s, 87% start-
ed using them routinely after January 2000 (Fig. 1).
Dispensers were located in patient rooms in 80% of facili-
ties, in treatment rooms in 89% of facilities, and in
hallways in 61% of facilities. The initial date of use of alco-
hol-based hand rubs was available for 766 (96%) of the
facilities; these facilities had accrued an estimated com-
bined total of 1,430 hospital-years of use of an alcohol-
based hand rub. None of the 798 respondents in facilities
using such products reported that a fire attributed to (or
involving) an alcohol-based hand rub dispenser had
occurred in his or her facility.
Ten percent (78 of 771) and 8% (60 of 777) of the
facilities, respectively, reported that local fire marshals
had instructed them to change the storage conditions of
Concise Communications
FIGURE 1. Trends in the use of alcohol-based hand rubs in healthcare facil-
ities in the United States, from January 1983 through March 2003. Source:
Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America, Association of Professionals
in Infection Control and Epidemiology, and Emerging Infections Network
online survey, March 2003.
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large stocks of alcohol-based hand rubs or to change the
location or size of the alcohol-based hand rub dispensers.
Overall, 11.4% (42 of 369) of the facilities reported that a
local fire marshal had told them to remove the alcohol-
based hand rub dispensers from hallways. The propor-
tion of respondents who had been told to remove hand
rub dispensers from hallways varied dramatically by geo-
graphic region, ranging from none (0 of 161) of the facil-
ities in 26 states to more than 50% (13 of 14) of the facili-
ties in 5 states (Fig. 2). In many states, one or more
facilities had been told to remove dispensers from hall-
ways, whereas others in the same state had not been
instructed to do so.
The interstate and intrastate variability in the
actions taken on this issue by local fire marshals may
relate in part to the existence of at least two different fire
codes regarding flammable products in healthcare facili-
ties.
DISCUSSION
Our study has several limitations. Due to the manner
in which the study was conducted, the responding facili-
ties do not represent a statistically valid sample of all
healthcare facilities in the United States. The fact that 95%
of respondents reported using alcohol-based hand rubs
suggests that personnel working in facilities using these
products were more likely to complete the questionnaire
than were those working in institutions where such prod-
ucts had not yet been adopted. Also, members of SHEA,
APIC, and EIN who did not have Internet access or whose
e-mail addresses were not registered with these organiza-
tions could not participate in the survey. Nonetheless, the
data provided by the survey, when combined with
decades of experience with alcohol-based hand rubs in
Europe,2,3 suggest that the incidence of fires associated
with the use of these products in healthcare settings is
extremely low.
Because increased use of alcohol-based hand rubs
has been shown to improve adherence with hand hygiene
among HCWs and to reduce healthcare-related infec-
tions,6,7 we believe that the potential benefits of having
these products available in easily accessible areas of
healthcare facilities (eg, hallways) far outweigh the appar-
ent low (and undocumented) potential fire hazard that
may occur with their use.
Dr. Boyce is from the Department of Medicine, Hospital of Saint
Raphael, and Yale University School of Medicine, New Haven,
Connecticut. Dr. Pearson is from the Division of Healthcare Quality
Promotion, National Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia.
Address reprint requests to John M. Boyce, MD, Section of
Infectious Diseases, Hospital of Saint Raphael, 1450 Chapel Street,
New Haven, CT 06511.
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A Nosocomial Outbreak of Legionella
pneumophila Caused by Contaminated
Transesophageal Echocardiography Probes
Pierre-Yves Levy, MD; Nadine Teysseire, PhD;
Jérôme Etienne, MD, PhD; Didier Raoult, MD, PhD
ABSTRACT
A case–control study of three cases of Legionella pneu-
mophila pneumonia identified transesophageal echocardiogra-
phy (TEE) as a risk factor. Patient isolates and environmental
strains from water used for rinsing TEE probes were identical by
pulsed-field gel electrophoresis. This is the first report of
endoscopy as a potential source of legionellosis (Infect Control
Hosp Epidemiol 2003;24:619-622).
Hospital-acquired Legionella pneumophila pneumo-
nia has a high fatality rate (higher than 30%) and an
increasing incidence.1 The most frequently reported
route of transmission has been through contaminated
aerosol; however, transmission through aspiration of con-
taminated water has also been reported.2 Hot water dis-
tribution systems have been shown to be the primary
reservoirs for Legionella species. Transmission of
microorganisms via endoscopes has been suspected but
never reported for L. pneumophila, to the best of our
knowledge. We describe 3 patients diagnosed as having
L. pneumophila pneumonia apparently acquired from
contaminated transesophageal echocardiography (TEE)
FIGURE 2. Proportion of responding facilities instructed to remove alcohol-
based hand rub dispensers from hallways, by state (N = 369).
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A 48-year-old man with mitral insufficiency was hos-
pitalized for cardiac insufficiency. TEE was performed 1
week after admission and the patient developed pneumo-
nia 7 days later. Bronchoalveolar lavage (BAL) was then
performed and was positive for serogroup 1 L. pneu-
mophila. Results of the Legionella urinary antigen test
were also positive.
Case 2
A 76-year-old man was hospitalized for atrioventricu-
lar dysfunction. TEE was performed and the patient devel-
oped pneumonia 6 days later. BAL culture was negative.
Results of the Legionella urinary antigen test were positive
twice, and the indirect fluorescent antibody test for L. pneu-
mophila showed a seroconversion from negative to 1:256.
Case 3
A 75-year-old man was hospitalized for atrial dys-
function. TEE was performed on the day after admission
and the patient developed pneumonia 2 weeks later. BAL
culture recovered serogroup 1 L. pneumophila. Results of
the urinary antigen test were negative twice, 2 and 10
days after the onset of pneumonia. Indirect fluorescent
antibody testing showed a conversion from a negative
baseline titer to 1:256 in the convalescent titer.
METHODS
We collected 1 L of cold and warm water from each of
21 different taps within a week after the third diagnosed
case. A solution containing 0.5 mL of 0.1 N sodium thiosul-
fate was added to neutralize the residual-free chlorine.3
Human and environmental specimens were cultured on
buffered charcoal-yeast extract medium (bioMérieux,
Marcy l’Etoile, France) and glycine–vancomycin–polymyx-
in B–cycloheximide selective agar (Oxoïd, Dardilly,
France), with and without heat treatment, following the
usual procedures for the isolation of Legionella species.3
Identification of Legionella isolates was performed using a
Legionella latex test kit (Oxoïd) and confirmed by poly-
merase chain reaction amplifying the macrophage infectivi-
ty potentiator gene.4
The urinary antigen test (Société Binax, Portland,
ME) detecting specific lipopolysaccharide antigen of L.
pneumophila serogroup 1 was used according to the man-
ufacturer’s instructions.5 Antibodies in serum samples
were estimated by using the indirect immunofluorescent
antibody test as previously described.6
Chromosomal pulsed-field gel electrophoresis analy-
sis was performed on the isolates as previously
described.7 Briefly, legionellae were treated with pro-
teinase K (50 µg/mL) in TE buffer (10 mM of Tris-HCl
and 1 mM of EDTA; pH 8) for 24 hours at 55°C, and DNA
was digested with 20 IU of SfiI restriction enzyme
(Boehringer Mannheim, Meylan, France) for 16 hours at
50°C. Fragments of DNA were separated in a 0.8%
agarose gel prepared and run in 0.5% Tris-borate–EDTA
buffer (pH 8.3) in a contour-clamped homogeneous elec-
tric field apparatus (CHEF DR II PFGE system, Bio-Rad
Laboratories, Ivry sur Seine, France) with a constant volt-
age of 150 V. Runs were performed with constant pulse
times (25 seconds) at 10°C for 11 hours and increasing
pulse times (35 to 60 seconds) at 10°C for 11 hours.
Isolates with patterns that differed by no more than three
restriction fragments were considered to have the same
pulsetype, whereas organisms differing by more than
three restriction fragments were considered sufficiently
divergent to warrant a separate pulsetype designation.8
The outbreak occurred in a 300-bed private hospital.
After two affected patients were identified, an investiga-
tion was started and a case–control study was initiated. A
case-patient was defined as any patient who had either L.
pneumophila isolated from BAL or a positive result on the
Legionella urinary antigen test. Each case was matched to
four control-patients without evidence of legionellosis,
who were hospitalized at the same time either in the same
unit for any reason or for the same reason in a different
unit. Risk factors identified were TEE, BAL or broncho-
scopic aspiration, mechanical ventilation, the use of nebu-
lizers, the use of oxygen humidifiers, shower use, the use
of the ice machine, drinking nonbottled water, and the
location of patient rooms. Data on possible risk factors
were abstracted from clinical records and Fisher’s exact
test was used to compare frequencies of exposure for
cases and controls.
RESULTS
Three patients were diagnosed as having L. pneu-
mophila, two by positive culture from BAL and one by
positive result on urinary antigen test (Table). The two
cases for which serology was performed showed sero-
conversion. An outbreak was identified because three
cases were diagnosed in 3 days in the same clinic.
Patients were hospitalized for 6 to 12 days after TEE,
prior to the onset of infection, and therefore likely suf-
fered nosocomial infection. The case–control study
demonstrated that TEE was the only significant risk fac-
tor for the three case-patients (3 of 3 vs 0 of 12; P = .002).
Following this finding, investigators from the infection
control team reviewed the current practices and noted
that the TEE probes had been disinfected inside the
examination room equipped with two taps. One tap,
which was used for the rinsing procedure, was equipped
with a 0.2-µ filter. The second tap, theoretically used for
hand washing only, did not have a filter. A new nurse had
reversed the use of the taps during the last step of the
rinse procedure before drying. Drinking water was not
given to patients to assist in swallowing the probe. Using
the appropriate water supply, sending the TEE probes to
the central sterilization unit for disinfection, and improv-
ing the control of chlorination were associated with ter-
mination of the outbreak. 
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Nine different isolates of L. pneumophila were iso-
lated from the water samples, including those from the tap
wrongly used during the outbreak for rinsing the TEE
probes. Clinical isolates from the two culture-positive
patients, two other cases diagnosed previously within the
year, and the nine environmental strains were compared
by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis. Pulsetypes of the two
patients from this outbreak and one environmental isolate
from the TEE room (environmental strain 8) were nearly
identical. Strains from previous cases and other strains
found in the environment water supplies exhibited other
pulsetypes (Figure). 
DISCUSSION
In this study, by investigating three cases of nosoco-
mial legionnaires’ disease in a clinic, we were able to iden-
tify a single significant risk factor (ie, TEE with a probe
rinsed with contaminated water) and a single clone isolat-
ed from two patients and from the water used to rinse the
endoscope. Therefore, there is strong circumstantial evi-
dence that patients were infected by a contaminated probe
during TEE. This is the first description of the involvement
of such a procedure in the nosocomial transmission of L.
pneumophila. Nasogastric tubes have been implicated in
legionnaires’ disease, presumably by microaspiration of
contaminated water.9 A pseudoepidemic has been report-
ed in which contaminated bronchoscopes resulted in false-
positive cultures from clinical samples taken at bron-
choscopy from healthy patients.10 This report does not
represent a pseudoepidemic because clinical infection was
present and Legionella was confirmed to be the etiologic
agent by Legionella antibody seroconversion or a positive
result on the urinary antigen test in each patient. It sug-
gests that endoscopic instruments can become contami-
nated following adequate disinfection procedures if non-
sterile water is used for the final rinse.
Drs. Levy and Raoult are from the Unité Des Rickettsies, Faculté
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TABLE
NOSOCOMIAL OUTBREAK OF LEGIONELLA PNEUMOPHILA CAUSED BY TRANSESOPHAGEAL ECHOCARDIOGRAPHY
First Diagnosis
Case Gender/ Date of Underlying Date of Date of Date of Urinary Sero-
No. Age (y) Admission Disease TEE Pneumonia Diagnosis Culture Antigen Conversion
1 M/48 June 12 Aortic stenosis June 20 June 27 June 28 + + NP
2 M/76 June 10 Ventricular June 23 June 29 June 30 - + +
dysfunction
3 M/75 June 15 Atrial dys- June 16 June 28 June 5 + - +
function
TEE = transesophageal echocardiography; NP = not performed.
FIGURE. Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis analysis of strains of Legionella
pneumophila 1. Strain Paris = reference strain; ENV = environmental
strains (ENV 8 was collected in the water used to rinse the transesophageal
echocardiography probe); HS = human strains obtained the year before in
this institution (L. pneumophila 1: HS1; L. pneumophila 3: HS2); P.R. = pre-
sent work strains.
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Rethinking Sterilization Practices:
Evidence for Event-Related Outdating
Joan Webster, RN, BA; Wendy Lloyd, RN; Ping
Ho, RN; Christine Burridge, RN; Narelle George,
BSc, MSc
ABSTRACT
A prospective study was conducted during a 2-year period
to evaluate the effectiveness of event-related outdating. Hospital-
prepared sterilized items (n = 152) were shelved in wards and
every 3 months, several articles were retrieved and microbiolog-
ically tested. During the 2-year period, all of the items tested
were sterile (Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2003;24:622-624).
Most Australian hospitals continue to observe time-
related expiry dating for hospital-prepared sterilized
items. Shelf life is usually set at 1 month after processing,
and after this time, stock is returned to the sterilizing
department for repackaging and resterilization. Evidence
to support the 1-month shelf life is lacking, but it is gen-
erally attributed to recommendations published in 1983
by the Center for Disease Control.1 More recent guide-
lines support event-related outdating, which purports that
sterile goods remain sterile indefinitely unless packaging
integrity is compromised. This concept has been tested in
practice conditions.2,3 As there are clear cost benefits
associated with adopting an event-related outdating
approach,4 it is difficult to understand why hospitals con-
tinue to observe the older standard. 
Adherence with time-related expiry dating may be
due to the argument that there is no way of knowing
whether an “event” has occurred or to difficulties in inter-
preting the newer guidelines, which include attention to
the type and configuration of packaging materials used,
the number of times a package is handled before use, stor-
age on open or closed shelving, the condition of the stor-
age area (eg, cleanliness, temperature, and humidity), the
use of dust covers, and the method of sealing dust cov-
ers.5
Investigations to date have not tested the safety of
shelf life in uncontrolled conditions nor has event-related
outdating beyond a 12-month period been examined.
Moreover, newer, high-quality wrapping materials have
been introduced in recent years that were unavailable
when data were collected for previous studies. The pur-
pose of this study was to test event-related outdating dur-
ing a 2-year period in a variety of environmental condi-
tions. 
METHODS
In June 1999, following intensive staff education
about event-related outdating and information about the
study (Figure), 152 packs containing 304 test items were
prepared by the staf f of the Central Sterilising
Department of the Royal Women’s Hospital, Brisbane.
Packs contained a copper rod wrapped in a green hand
towel, simulating a surgical instrument. A cotton ball,
simulating linen, was placed on top of the green towel.
Packs were wrapped in Kimguard (Kimberley-Clarke,
Milson Point, New South Wales, Australia), Dextrex S
(Drager Medical Australia, Notting Hill, Victoria,
Australia), or green crepe (Charles R. Gabb and Co.,
Sumner Park, Brisbane, Australia) and sealed with steril-
izing indicator tape. Copper rods were also placed in
appropriately sized, laminated pouches (Steripeel, Bard
Australia, North Ryde, New South Wales, Australia). All
items were sterilized on the same day. A biological indi-
cator (EZ TEST, Austmel, Nerang, Queensland,
Australia) was processed with the loads to ensure effec-
tive sterilization.
Packs were distributed to five areas of the hospital
FIGURE. Prestudy information. CSSD = Central Sterilising Department.
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(two operating theaters, the neonatal intensive care nurs-
ery, and two postnatal wards) where they were stored on
either closed or open shelving. No dust covers were used.
Only 2 of the areas were air conditioned. Every 3 months
during a 2-year period, a predetermined number of items
were removed from the shelves in each area and sent to
the pathology department. Toward the end of the study
period, 3 hospital-packed items found in the trunk of a
community vehicle (dated 1992) were also included.
Packs were opened in a biohazard hood and the con-
tents were transferred under sterile conditions into indi-
vidual bottles containing tryptone soy broth and incubat-
ed at 35°C for 7 days and a further 7 days at 28°C. Bottles
were examined for turbidity or evidence of microbial
growth after incubation. Results were reported as “no
growth” or “growth” with organism identification. The
testing of the three items from the community vehicle dif-
fered only in that the entire surface of the item was
swabbed with a sterile cotton-tipped swab that was then
immersed in the tryptone soy broth.
RESULTS 
During the study period, the hospital was relocated
to a new building and the remaining test packs were
reshelved. In the move, 21 packs were lost to follow-up. Of
the original sample, 131 (86.2%) of the packs containing
262 test items were available for testing. Nine items were
returned to the Central Sterilising Department because
an “event” had occurred: 2 had had their wrapping torn, 6
had been dropped, and 1 had blood on the outer wrap-
ping. These packs were included in the testing process as
were the items from the community vehicle. After 14 days
of incubation, all 262 test items were sterile. 
DISCUSSION
The study was designed to test event-related out-
dating in suboptimal settings. Many of the storage areas
in the old hospital were not air conditioned and did not
comply with current best practice standards. For exam-
ple, in one of the operating rooms there was no geo-
graphic or physical division between “clean” and “dirty”
areas. Hospital-prepared sterile stock was stored on open
shelving, near the sluice area. Conditions were cramped
and stock was handled frequently. Similarly, in the neona-
tal nursery, sterile stock was stored on open shelving in
a large storage room, along with other nonsterile nursery
items. The area was located between two wards and was
accessible from both. As a consequence, the area was
used as a corridor and carried a large volume of traffic.
Despite these conditions, all test articles remained ster-
ile.
Perhaps the most surprising finding was associated
with the hospital-prepared scissors and forceps, wrapped
in laminated pouches and retrieved from a box in the
trunk of a community vehicle. The articles had been there
for 9 years prior to testing and would have been exposed
to a great deal of handling. Because Brisbane has a sub-
tropical climate, temperatures and humidity levels would
have been extreme at certain times of the year. It was also
interesting that none of the articles that had suffered an
“event” in the hospital was contaminated. 
These results challenge the existing belief that “the
probability of a contaminating event occurring increases
with time and handling.”6 Results support the concept that
products, when correctly wrapped and sterilized, will
remain sterile unless the wrapping is damaged. Although
2 years was the longest period that test items were stored
in this study, there is no reason to suggest that this peri-
od should be the limit of shelf life. If stock is rotated,
items should not require reprocessing unless they have
been contaminated. However, common sense suggests
that goods that remain on shelves unused for this period
may not need to be there.
During the study, the Central Sterilising Department
at the Royal Women’s Hospital was amalgamated with the
Royal Brisbane Hospital’s sterilizing service into a com-
bined Sterile Processing Centre located in the new hospi-
tal. An audit conducted at the conclusion of the study
showed that approximately 18,000 date-expired items
were returned to the Sterile Processing Centre for repro-
cessing annually. A formula for estimating the cost of
time-related expiry dating has been proposed that
includes reprocessing labor costs, restocking supply
costs, and reprocessing supply costs.7 However, even
using a conservative estimate of $5.00 per item will yield
a recurrent cost savings of approximately $90,000 per
year when event-related outdating is implemented across
the two hospitals. In calculating costs, waste disposal may
be an additional consideration. 
It was unfortunate that not all packs were recover-
able. We went to extraordinary lengths to find them, but
were unable to do so. This was one limitation of the study.
Another limitation was that we included only small packs,
whereas larger items may have been more susceptible to
damage. However, quality monitoring following the
implementation of event-related outdating elsewhere
found that the integrity of all sterile items was main-
tained.4 We believe that event-related outdating is safe
and cost-effective and should replace time-related expiry
dating.
Ms. Webster and Ms. Burridge are from Royal Brisbane and
Royal Women’s Hospitals; Ms. Lloyd and Ms. Ho are from the Central
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Use of Pulsed-Field Gel Electrophoresis
in Infection Control Issues Concerning
Burkholderia cepacia
Adam Jenney, FRACP; Lisa Liolios, BSc; Denis
Spelman, FRACP, MPH; Philip Russo, BN, MCE;
John Wilson, FRACP, PhD; Steven Wesselingh,
FRACP, PhD; Tom Kotsimbos, FRACP, MD
ABSTRACT
There was concern that nosocomial person-to-person trans-
mission of Burkholderia cepacia had occurred when two patients
with cystic fibrosis shared a bathroom. Pulsed-field gel elec-
trophoresis demonstrated that the two isolates were unrelated.
Subsequent testing of 34 stored isolates of B. cepacia demon-
strated that no particular clone predominated in our hospital
(Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2003;24:624-626).
Burkholderia cepacia is an aerobic, glucose nonfer-
menting, motile gram-negative bacillus found in soil and
water and is a member of the family of Pseudomonadaceae
to which patients with cystic fibrosis (CF) are particularly
susceptible.
In the 1980s, adverse effects of B. cepacia in
patients with CF were first noted in the United States.1
Later, a mortality rate of 80% was reported for patients
with CF who received bilateral lung transplants when col-
onized with B. cepacia genomovar III.2 Epidemiologic evi-
dence has emerged that social contact between patients
with CF is a risk factor for the spread of B. cepacia,
although this is probably from direct contact with sputum
and saliva via fomites rather than aerosolization of the
organism by coughing.3 This has led some centers to
introduce strategies to reduce the spread of B. cepacia
among patients with CF (eg, segregation of carriers of B.
cepacia from those without it), although this remains con-
troversial.4
The aim of this study was to examine the epidemi-
ology of strains of B. cepacia in a hospital where segre-
gation of patients with CF is practiced. PFGE demon-
strated that person-to-person transmission of B. cepacia




The Alfred Hospital is a 350-bed, tertiary-care refer-
ral university hospital in metropolitan Melbourne. It has a
large respiratory unit that provides a statewide referral
service for adults with CF (approximately 250 patients
receiving ongoing follow-up) and a national lung trans-
plant service that performs 40 lung transplants each year.
Patients
Patient A with CF was admitted to the respiratory
unit with an infective exacerbation of CF-related lung dis-
ease. The stay overlapped with that of patient B (also
admitted for intravenous antibiotic therapy for CF-related
lung disease) by 3 days. Patient B was known to be colo-
nized with B. cepacia and, in accordance with published
infection control guidelines,5 was subject to certain prac-
tices to help reduce the transmission of B. cepacia. These
practices included segregation to avoid close contact with
other patients, emphasis on personal hygiene (frequent
hand washing and careful sputum disposal), and not shar-
ing equipment (eg, eating and drinking utensils and res-
piratory equipment). Contact precautions are not routine-
ly employed in our hospital and healthcare workers do not
wear special apparel. Patients with B. cepacia are allocat-
ed a single room and, on this occasion, both patients A
and B had their own rooms; however, they shared a bath-
room. On the final day of hospitalization, patient A had a
sputum sample taken that subsequently grew B. cepacia.
There was concern that nosocomial person-to-person
transmission had occurred.
Identification
B. cepacia was identified by the culturing of sputum
directly onto oxidation–fermentation base–polymyxin
B–bacitracin-lactose medium and species was determined
using VITEK nonfermenter cards (bioMérieux, Marcy
l’Etoile, France) and confirmed by the API 20NE bacterial
identification system (bioMérieux). Eighteen of the iso-
lates had been sent to a reference laboratory and all were
subsequently confirmed to be B. cepacia by DNA-based
testing.
Chromosomal DNA Restriction Patterns by PFGE
Isolates were grown on horse blood agar at 37°C
overnight and a turbid cell suspension (0.45 to 0.5 OD595
nm) in 10 mM of Tris-chloride and 1 M of NaCl was made.
The cell suspensions were mixed with equal volumes of
2.4% wt/vol low–melting point agarose and blocks were
prepared. These were treated with lysis buffer (6 mM of
Tris-chloride, pH 7.6; 1 M of NaCl; 100 mM of EDTA, pH
7.6; 0.2% deoxycholate; and 0.5% N-laurylsarcosine) with
freshly added lysozyme (Sigma, St. Louis, MO) at 10
mg/mL and incubated at 37°C for at least 2 hours. Protein
digestion was achieved by transferring the blocks into an
ESP solution (0.5 M of EDTA, pH 9.0; 1% sarkosyl; and 1
mg/mL of proteinase K) and incubating overnight at
50°C. The DNA was digested with restriction enzyme
SpeI at 37°C overnight. Quarter blocks were loaded into
wells of 1% agarose gel in a 0.5  TBE solution (44.5 mM
of Tris-base, pH 7.6; 44.5 mM of boric acid; and 1 mM of
EDTA) and PFGE was performed using the Gene
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Navigator apparatus (Pharmacia-Biotech, Uppsala,
Sweden). The conditions for electrophoresis were 170 V
for 25 hours using pulse times of 5 seconds for 10.5 hours,
25 seconds for 10.5 hours, and 45 seconds for 4 hours in a
stepped program. Molecular markers ( DNA concate-
mers, Pharmacia-Biotech) were included with each gel
run. Gels were stained with ethidium bromide for 30 min-
utes and photographed under ultraviolet transillumina-
tion. DNA profiles were interpreted according to guide-
lines published by Tenover et al.6
RESULTS
The PFGE band pattern is shown in the figure.
There are more than seven different bands between the
isolates of the two patients; therefore, they are not of the
same clone. Phenotypically, both isolates had the same
appearance; however, they did show differing antibiotic
susceptibility profiles.
Thirty-four isolates collected between 1995 and 2000
were examined by PFGE. There was no recorded outbreak
of B. cepacia in the hospital during this period. Twenty-one
patients with CF provided 26 samples of sputum yielding B.
cepacia: 3 individuals provided 2 isolates each and 1 indi-
vidual provided 3 isolates. These repeat cultures were ana-
lyzed in this study as these samples were collected at least
6 months apart for each individual. Eight isolates were
from blood or sputum cultures of patients without CF. 
By PFGE, every individual had a genetically differ-
ent isolate (data not shown). The patients who provided
more than one isolate, however, were found to have genet-
ically identical strains at each point in time.
DISCUSSION
This study has demonstrated by molecular biology
that nosocomial spread of B. cepacia did not occur
between patient A and patient B. In addition, it showed
that our hospital has not had one predominant strain of B.
cepacia during a 5-year period. This situation had been
reported in Australia once before, in one of the two hospi-
tals described by Paul et al.,3 as well as in the United
States.7 However, both in Australia and elsewhere, certain
strains of B. cepacia can predominate in an institution,
perhaps as a result of nosocomial spread.3,8 Instances of
person-to-person spread of B. cepacia have been well doc-
umented both in and out of the hospital.9
PFGE of chromosomal DNA fragments has been
described as the “gold standard” of strain typing of B.
cepacia isolates10 for surveillance studies. PFGE for clon-
al identification has clear benefits over phenotypic meth-
ods. Different clones may have identical colony morphol-
ogy and biochemical reactions and often have similar
results on antimicrobial susceptibility testing, making
these relatively insensitive tests for determining clonal
variation unlike PFGE. However, PFGE is not a routine
test offered by every diagnostic laboratory. It requires
moderately expensive equipment and some specialized
technical skills. It also takes 3 to 4 days to obtain a result.
The infection control practices of our hospital are
based on published guidelines5 and we propose to follow
the advice of Govan,4 continuing the policy of patient seg-
regation and careful surveillance for B. cepacia in which
analysis using PFGE is vital. If nosocomial spread was
confirmed using PFGE, this evidence would be used to
dictate changes in the infection control policy. PFGE is a
relatively simple procedure that can help reassure indi-
viduals needing hospitalization that when two patients
have the same organism, person-to-person spread may
not have necessarily occurred. This is especially impor-
tant in a setting where there are potentially significant
problems with failing to identify person-to-person trans-
mission (eg, in patients with CF who have decreased res-
piratory host defenses and increased needs for social
interaction and support).
FIGURE. Transilluminated pulsed-
field gel electrophoresis showing dif-
ferent band patterns (large arrow) for
the Burkholderia cepacia isolates of
our two patients. MW = molecular
weight marker; A = patient A; B =
patient B.
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Medical Residents at a Tertiary-Care
Medical Center
Gonzalo Bearman, MD; Linda Fuentes, RN; Jaclyn
Van Lieu Vorenkamp, MD, MPH; Lewis M. Drusin,
MD, MPH
ABSTRACT
Sixty-four percent of medical residents unimmunized by
the Occupational Health Service were immunized elsewhere.
Those unvaccinated lacked time to comply. An immune staff is
critical to prevent transmission to high-risk patients and limit
absenteeism. The hospital is implementing a program to deliver
medical care to the house staff (Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol
2003;24:626-628).
Despite national recommendations that healthcare
workers who have contact with patients should be vacci-
nated for influenza, recent studies suggest that compli-
ance among healthcare workers remains low.1,2 As med-
ical residents are frequently the first-line providers for
hospitalized and debilitated patients, it is crucial that they
be immunized for influenza yearly.
Although staff may be immunized in a variety of set-
tings, influenza vaccination is offered through the hospi-
tal Occupational Health Service (OHS). Given the peren-
nially low rate of influenza vaccination in our academic
medical center, we sought to determine the true rate of
immunization and, if it was low, improve compliance
among our medical housestaff. A campaign was organized
to bring the influenza vaccine to resident conferences, the
general medical clinic, and intensive care units.
Housestaff were notified of influenza vaccine availability
by the chief resident’s office, broadcast e-mails, and
broadcast text paging. All vaccines were administered by
the OHS. Despite these efforts, the rate of immunization
remained below 50%. This study was undertaken to deter-
mine the accuracy of vaccination status and to define the
reasons for noncompliance with influenza vaccination
among the medical housestaff.
METHODS
A list of all medical housestaff vaccinated for influen-
za by the OHS was cross-checked with the medical hous-
estaff roster provided by the department of medicine. All
housestaff not immunized were contacted by pager and
interviewed by telephone, using a standardized question-
naire. All responses were documented anonymously. The
institutional review board approved the study and ques-
tionnaire. 
The questionnaire had three principal objectives.
The first was to determine whether the house officer had
indeed been vaccinated, and if so, where? Second, those
not vaccinated were asked whether they were aware of
the ongoing influenza immunization campaign. Finally,
the housestaff were asked why they chose not to comply.
All results were descriptive and were finalized as propor-
tions.
RESULTS
Of the 127 medical housestaff, 61 (48%) were for-
mally vaccinated by the OHS. Of the 66 medical house
officers not vaccinated by the OHS, 53 (80%) were suc-
cessfully interviewed. Thirty-four (64%) of those inter-
viewed reported having been vaccinated for influenza dur-
ing the fall and winter of 2001–2002. Twenty (59%) of the
34 vaccinated were immunized by a colleague in the gen-
eral medical clinic and 14 (41%) were vaccinated else-
where. Of these 14 house officers, 6 were vaccinated at an
off-site clinical rotation; 3 were vaccinated by the OHS; 1
was vaccinated by the military (Army Reserves); 2 were
vaccinated at an unspecified hospital location; 1 was vac-
cinated in the dialysis center; and 1 was vaccinated at
home by a physician–spouse (Figure).
Nineteen of the 53 residents interviewed were not
vaccinated for influenza in the winter of 2001–2002,
although they were aware of the ongoing hospital vacci-
nation campaign. Three (16%) of the 19 were afraid of side
effects. One house officer (5%) had a medical contraindi-
cation to immunization. One house officer (5%) refused
vaccination due to pregnancy. Fourteen (74%) of 19 house
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officers were not vaccinated because either they were too
busy or vaccination was too inconvenient.
DISCUSSION
The medical housestaff in this tertiary-care, acade-
mic medical center appeared to have a perennially low
rate of influenza vaccination. The overall proportion of
medical house officers immunized by the OHS was below
50% even after a 3-month period (October through
December) of aggressive promotion of immunization
through the chief medical resident’s office and broadcast
e-mails and paging to notify housestaff of vaccination at
the general medical clinic, resident conferences, and
intensive care units. 
Low levels of compliance with vaccination have been
well documented in the literature.3-5 Several studies have
defined the reasons for noncompliance in healthcare sys-
tems.3,6 The respondents have included physicians, nurs-
es, and laboratory and clerical personnel. This study, 
however, focused exclusively on the reasons for the non-
compliance of medical house officers with influenza vac-
cination. In one sizeable survey, common reasons for non-
compliance included fear of side effects, reaction to the
vaccine, and the belief that the vaccine is not necessary
due to the perceived low likelihood of getting influenza.2
Being too busy was uncommonly cited as a reason for
nonacceptance of the influenza vaccine.2 One academic
medical center, however, reported rates of influenza
immunization as high as 99% among their medical resi-
dents.7 In this setting, residents were immunized in the
medical clinic by medical clinic nursing staff, not in the
employee health service. 
All of the nonvaccinated respondents were aware of
the ongoing campaign for influenza vaccination. Although
efforts were made to bring the vaccine to areas of resident
activity such as clinics, conferences, and intensive care
units, 74% of nonvaccinated respondents cited being too
busy and the inconvenience of the vaccination as the main
reasons to forego vaccination. Few reported a fear of side
effects. None reported a lack of vaccine efficacy as a
deterrent to vaccination. The perception of lack of time
appears to be the main barrier to vaccination of medical
residents in our institution. 
A significant proportion (64%) of housestaff not vac-
cinated by the OHS were indeed immunized for influenza
in the winter of 2001–2002. Most were vaccinated by
housestaff colleagues in the general medical clinic at an
opportune time. Others reported vaccination by col-
leagues on hospital floors, in the dialysis unit, and at
home. According to the medical bylaws, this is unaccept-
able for several reasons. First, they were using a vaccine
designated for patients. Second, and perhaps more
important, the hospital specifically forbids housestaff to
deliver informal or casual medical care to each other for
a variety of reasons, which include the inability to docu-
ment the technique of administration, handling, and stor-
age of the vaccine and safety issues. Because these
immunizations had been neither documented nor report-
ed to the OHS, these residents were not formally regis-
tered as having been vaccinated for influenza.
Furthermore, this informal method of immunization
underscores the apparent importance of convenience and
accessibility in overcoming noncompliance with influen-
za vaccination. Three of the presumed nonvaccinated res-
idents responded that they had indeed been vaccinated
by the OHS. It is not known whether there had been an
error in documentation.
These alternate vaccination sites spuriously decrease
the rate of influenza vaccination among medical housestaff
as vaccination is undocumented by the OHS. The total
number of housestaff vaccinated for influenza, including
those identified by this study, was 95 (75%) of 127 residents
compared with 48% recorded by the OHS. It is important
for hospital epidemiology and occupational health practi-
tioners to document the influenza immunization status of
employees to ensure a safe environment for high-risk
patients. Knowledge of the influenza vaccination status of
employees is critical in an outbreak to better allocate
immune personnel to areas of direct patient care. This will
both prevent nosocomial transmission of infection to older,
high-risk patients, in whom the efficacy of immunization is
approximately 58%,8 and limit worker absenteeism. This is
particularly relevant to medical housestaff who frequently
function as the first-line providers of care. 
Of medical residents not vaccinated for influenza,
most cited the inconvenience of the vaccination and being
too busy as the reason for noncompliance, underscoring
the importance of convenience and accessibility. To
address the issues of inconvenience and compliance with
the medical bylaws, the hospital is implementing a more
convenient system for delivering comprehensive medical
care to the housestaff. Each resident will be assigned to
an accessible attending physician through the OHS who
will be responsible for his or her health care. By address-
ing all of the problems associated with the convenience of
FIGURE. Medical residents vaccinated for influenza. OHS = Occupational
Health Service; GMC = general medical clinic.
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medical care for house officers, the expectation is that
compliance with the recommendations for influenza
immunization within the healthcare system will improve.
This is important to ensure the safety of high-risk patients
during the influenza season. 
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